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THE INDIGENOUS ALTERNATIVE: TEK, IEL,
FOR THE UNSOLVABLE

AND

SOLUTIONS

Cara Victoria Sawyer*

Abstract
This comment addresses the intentional exclusion of Indigenous nations from
the United Nations and, consequently, from the UNFCCC and subsequent climate regime. It cautions of the adverse consequences that have resulted from
such exclusion, both to the warming planet and to all its human residents. Critics
say that the climate regime has fallen woefully short of reaching its goals. However, this comment suggests that including Indigenous nations in substantial international climate change conversations and decisions could result in yet-to-bemade progress toward reducing global warming. The permanent position status
that the Inuit people hold on the Arctic Council, for example, helped empower
them to envisage a unique solution to the impact climate change was having on
their lives and take action in an international court to plant their idea in the international consciousness—that human rights and environmental rights are inextricably intertwined.
This comment posits that the clean development mechanism (“CDM”) is not
inherently broken, but rather that carbon markets have been poorly deployed and
can be reimagined to substantially address climate change. Including Indigenous
experts with traditional ecological knowledge (“TEK”) on the expert committee
mandated by the Paris Agreement and granting permanent position or voting status to Indigenous nations within the UN climate regime could bring alternate and
lasting solutions in climate change. To illustrate how Indigenous philosophies
might bear on reimagining carbon markets, the comment compares current carbon market implementation with how two different Indigenous philosophies
might alter them such that they in fact operate to achieve the goals of the Paris
Agreement.

*
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Introduction

To understand why Indigenous voices are conspicuously missing from international conversations around climate change and the disastrous fallout such omission entails, we must begin with the colonialism that was foundational in
building the international legal structure. As a result, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) and other international environmental governance mechanisms intentionally exclude Indigenous peoples and
traditional ecological knowledge (“TEK”) from discussions and decision-making
in international environmental law (“IEL”). At a basic level, tribal governance
structures are generally excluded from United Nations (“UN”) governance bodies
because they are not a State. This and other systematic exclusion tactics are a
gross lapse in judgment that negatively affects us all and require remedy.
This comment insists that all Indigenous nations should participate in international organizations not just because it is their right, but because consideration of
all cultural viewpoints has the potential to yield creative solutions. The Inuit possess the right to permanent participation in an international body and, with such
support, are able to connect human rights infringements from climate change
with human rights violations on the international stage. The comment then examines alternative economic theories propounded by two different Indigenous nations as applied to the climate regime’s Clean Development Mechanism
(“CDM”). Each proposes a viable alternative application of the CDM. It concludes that the CDM is not inherently broken but incorrectly deployed, holding
out hope that the goals of the Paris Agreement may still be met, and that climate
change may still be addressed.
114
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II.

Background

The climate regime (describing the body of IEL agreements created under the
UNFCCC framework)1 has proven woefully inadequate in addressing principle
causes of climate change, as evinced both by our own senses and a massive and
ever-growing body of science,2 while often exacerbating the problem. The “historic” Paris Agreement (“Agreement”) came into force in 2015, but many scientists, scholars, and civil society groups point out critical flaws.3 Solutions are
almost entirely non-binding and enable major polluters to abrogate responsibility
for the harms they cause.4 The Agreement and underlying UNFCCC create “false
solutions,” such as carbon markets and carbon offset mechanisms.5 These market
mechanisms purport to offer a solution, but in effect allow polluters to continue
with business as usual and even profit in the meantime.6 An Indigenous Environment Network report describes carbon markets as a privatization of our shared
atmosphere.7 Other climate justice groups demonstrate how climate markets further compromise the rights of communities disproportionately affected by climate change, such as Indigenous nations, who hold little or no responsibility for
it.8
A. IEL, the Climate Regime, and Flawed Economic Mechanisms
The UN climate regime created and continues to justify global carbon markets,
which are criticized as ineffective at best and actively detrimental at worst.9 In
the face of developed countries’ resistance to binding treaty regulations or contingent liability, the climate regime employed nationally determined contributions (“NDCs”), whereby each Party voluntarily declares how much they will
reduce emissions.10 The Kyoto Protocol created three “flexibility mechanisms.”11
1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 4, Mar. 21, 1994, 1771 U.N.T.S.
107, 170 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
2 See generally MILLENNIUM ECOSYSTEM ASSESSMENT: ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING
SYNTHESIS (Millennium Assessment Board of Review Editors et al. eds, 2005) [hereinafter MEA
Report].
3 Julia Dehm, Carbon Colonialism or Climate Justice? Interrogating the International Climate Regime from a TWAIL Perspective, 33 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. no. 3, 2016, 129, 130-32.
4 Dehm, supra note 3, at 130.
5 Id.
6 Dehm, Carbon Colonialism, at 131; UNFCCC, supra note 1; Paris Agreement, Dec. 12, 1995,
Registration No. 54113 [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
7 Indigenous Environment Network, No to Colonialism: Indigenous Peoples’ Guide False Solutions
to Climate Change 4 (2009).
8 Dehm, supra note 3, at 130; Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, South of South: Examining the International Climate Regime from an Indigenous Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
THE GLOBAL SOUTH 451, 451 (Shawkat Alam et al. eds., 2016).
9 Dehm, supra note 3, at 134; Chuwumerije Okerere & Philip Coventry, Climate Justice and the
International Regime: Before, During, and After Paris, 7 WILEY PERIODICALS 834, 838 (2016).
10 Paris Agreement, supra note 6, Art. 4, ¶ 2]; Dehm, supra note 3, at 132; Claudia Comberti,
Thomas F. Thornton, & Michaela Korodimu, Addressing Indigenous Peoples’ Marginalisation at International Climate Negotiations: Adaptation and Resilience at the Margins 11 (Envtl. Change Institute,
Univ. of Oxford, Working Paper 2016) (available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2870412).
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Parties could save or prevent emissions using any of the three.12 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (“REDD+”) enables credit production from forest conservation-based projects.13 Joint Implementation (“JI”)
consists of a State or company sponsoring a project in another State that would
otherwise not occur, with such projects’ goals being to reduce anthropogenic
(i.e., human-created, emissions).14 Finally, the CDM is the method by which carbon trading is enabled.15 The Paris Agreement expanded carbon markets,
whereby a country that was under its NDC allowance could either sell or trade
representative credits with another State that needed to buy or trade in order to
“reduce” its emissions to meet its NDC.16 Reimagining the CDM is the focus of
this comment’s proposal.
Author Julia Dehm provides a Third World Approach to International Law
(“TWAIL”) perspective of the CDM, noting that although many studies demonstrate how futile it is to achieve any significant emissions reductions through the
CDM, the climate regime nonetheless continues to justify carbon markets because they take a global perspective and thus provide commonality.17 Though
this is perhaps technically accurate, it is nonetheless over-simplified and inadequate.18 Both emissions (sources) and ‘sinks’ (carbon storage mechanisms) could
be viewed as an aggregate. However, the idea is inherently flawed because it fails
to address root causes of climate change.19 Carbon markets instead use a ‘free
market’ mechanism to financially allocate usage of sinks and sources.20 The carbon offset credit systems allow emitters to purchase the right to pollute, thus
creating no actual reduction of emissions and failing to achieve the reason the
CDM was created in the first place—to actually reduce the increasing of the
Earth’s temperature.21 Indeed, the Paris Agreement aimed to hold global temperature increase to a maximum of 2° C with a nod towards adhering to 1.5°,22 but
were all countries to meet their NDCs, scientific projections show the planet will
still ultimately warm by 2.7-3.7 °C.23 Not only do carbon markets fail to sufficiently reduce emissions to meet Paris Agreement goals, but what is worse, the
11 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Art. 12, Feb. 16,
2005, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162, 224 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]; Dehm, supra note 3, at 133.
12

Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11.

13

Dehm, supra note 3, at 132-33.

14

Id.

15

Kronk Warner, supra note 8, at 451.

16

Paris Agreement, supra note 6, Art. 4, ¶ 2(a); see also Dehm, supra note 3, at 133.

17

Dehm, supra note 3, at 142, 145-46 (in this context, commonality implies that the solution is
common to all who are impacted).
18

Dehm, supra note 3, at 145-46.

19

Dehm, supra note 3, at 137, 145-46.

20

Id.

21

Dehm, supra note 3, at 132-34.

22

Paris Agreement, supra note 6, Art. 2, ¶ 1(a); see also Okerere & Coventry, supra note 9, at 839.

23

Okerere & Coventry, supra note 9, at 839.
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implementation of these mechanisms often leave chaos in their wake.24 There are
several issues.
First, carbon offset markets promote “a system of technocratic rule managed
by experts.”25 Such systems take power from local actors and place decision
making in the hands of scientists and “experts” who dictate from the top down
what will be done to solve the problem of climate change.
Additionally, when land is restricted to carbon offset purposes, those living
traditionally on land can be ousted, and any resulting benefit is funneled to the
purses of a few.26 For example, under REDD+, General Motors, American Electric Power, and Chevron purchased carbon offset credits to offset their emissions
and make money on the carbon market by ‘helping’ to save the Amazon.27 After
creating forest reserves under REDD+, they hired local Green Police to enforce
protection of their ‘investment,’ with the resultant “green grabbing” forcing Indigenous peoples off of lands they had traditionally inhabited – and, ironically,
helped to sustainably manage.28
For these and other reasons, the current approach to carbon offsetting does not
work. However, though Dehm argues carbon markets do not work as a matter of
course, it may instead be possible to address climate change and achieve the
goals of the Paris Agreement through other means.
B. Marginalization of Indigenous Peoples in International Law
There have been limited opportunities for Indigenous peoples to present their
concerns, ideas, or knowledge, including TEK, in the UN or other important international fora, and similarly the climate regime has yet to truly consider Indigenous perspectives.29
To find out why, we must look to the history and philosophy behind international law. International law distinguishes between the global North and the
global South. Northern30 countries with technological and industrial advance24

Kronk Warner, supra note 8, at 451; Okerere & Coventry, supra note 9, at 839.
Dehm, supra note 3, at 135.
26 Dehm, supra note 3, at 136.
27 Kronk Warner, supra note 8, at 451; see also Dehm, supra note 3, at 134-35.
28 Kronk Warner, supra note 8, at 451; see also Dehm, supra note 3, at 134-35.
29 Comberti et al. supra note 10, at 2; Winona LaDuke, Traditional Ecological Knowledge and
Environmental Futures, COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L.& POL’Y 127, 133-34 (1994); Kronk Warner, supra
note 8, at 451; Sabaa Ahmad Khan, Rebalancing State and Indigenous Sovereignties in International
Law: An Artic Lens on Trajectories for Global Governance, LEIDEN J. INT’L. L. 675, 685 (2019).
30 This paper distinguishes the global North (wealthy, industrialized countries such as the United
States, members of the European Union, Japan, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia who hold more
economic power and whose economic interests diverge from those of the global South), from Western
culture or society (the homogeneous cultural concept of a modern, industrialized, and Americanized
culture that rejects values arising from differing or traditional cultures). See, e.g., Sumudu Atapattu &
Carmen G. Gonzalez, The North-South Divide in International Environmental Law: Framing the Issues,
in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 1, 2 (Alam et al. eds., 2016) (defining
the global North); Samuel P. Huntington, The West Unique, Not Universal, 75 FOREIGN AFFS., no. 6,
1996, at 28, 28(defining Western culture).
25
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ments are often referred to as civilized, developed, or first-world.31 Whereas
these terms evoke positive imagery of arrival and top-tier positioning, in contrast,
the countries of the global South are considered primitive, referred to as developing or third-world, and hold a predictably lower position in the global power
hierarchy.32 This hierarchical system undergirded colonialism, and the resulting
international laws were designed to civilize the cultures who Europeans cased as
uncivilized.33 Northern mainstream cultures and methodologies came to dominate international governance, policy, cultural, and economic spheres, while
States of the global South continue to hold significantly less power and exert less
influence.34
However marginalized the South may be, Indigenous nations regardless of location are further marginalized, or “South of South.”35 The United Nations General Assembly (“UNGA”) does not recognize “nations,” though they are a group
of people with a common language, common lands, history, and culture.36 Instead, only States can be members of the UN.37 So even though there are over
5,000 nations, most go unrepresented amongst the 193 UN member-States.38
Created under the UN structure, the climate regime similarly only recognizes
States.39
Though countries in which Indigenous populations reside do hold seats, representation is nonetheless minimal, for several reasons.40 First, Indigenous people
and ideas remain underrepresented in State governance.41 Second, States often
discriminate against Indigenous peoples.42 Third, Indigenous non-Western selfgovernance methods frequently go unrecognized by their States of residence.43
As a result, Indigenous viewpoints remain un- or under-represented in climate
governance.44
31 M. Rafiqul Islam, History of the North-South Divide in International Law: Colonial Discourses,
Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH
23, 23 (Shawkat Alam et al. eds., 2016).
32

Id.

33

Antony Anghie, The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities, 27 3D
WORLD Q. 739, 741-42 (2006).
34

Atapattu, supra note 30, at 2; Anghie, supra note 33, at 741.

35

Kronk Warner, supra note 8, at 453-56.

36

LaDuke, supra note 29, at 132; U.N. Charter, Art. 4, ¶ 2.

37

LaDuke, supra note 29, at 132; U.N. Charter, Art. 4, ¶ 2.

38

LaDuke, supra note 29, at 132; Comberti et al., supra note 10, at 3; Member States, UNITED
NATIONS, https://www.un.org/about-us/member-states (last visited Dec. 26, 2021).
39 U.N. Charter, Art. 4, ¶ 2; UNFCCC, supra note 1, Art. 20; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11, at Art.
13, ¶ 8; Paris Agreement, supra note 6, at Art. 16, ¶ 8.
40

Comberti et al., supra note 10, at 23.

41

Comberti et al., supra note 10, at 23.

42

Id.

43
44
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C. TEK and IEL
Indigenous ways of thinking tend to differ from those of the global North.45
“Integrated system[s] of knowledge, practice, and beliefs” are considered TEK.46
Indigenous leaders in their own words describe TEK as:
“. . .a cumulative body of knowledge and beliefs, handed down through
generations by cultural transmission, about the relationship of living beings (including humans) with one another and with their environment.
Further, TEK is an attribute of societies with historical continuity in resource use practices; by and large, these are non-industrial or less technologically advanced societies, many of them Indigenous or tribal.”47

TEK is critically important in the context of climate change because a group of
people with personal, group, and generational knowledge hold a holistic and contextualized perception of their environment impossible to envision by any other
means. As one leader noted:
“. . .we spend a great deal of our time, through all seasons of the year,
travelling over, drinking, eating, smelling and living with the ecological
system which surrounds us. Aboriginal people often notice very minor
changes in quality, odour and vitality long before it comes obvious to
government enforcement agencies, scientists or other observers of the
same ecological system.”48

Thus, while Western scientists define their scope of study by excluding everything except a specific subject matter, Indigenous peoples instead define their
scope of study by including every aspect of an ecosystem.49
TEK is clearly invaluable to assessing the extent of climate change and creating solutions. However, to date, TEK is generally ignored in IEL fora.50 On the
rare occasion a Conference of the Parties (“COP”)51 allows an Indigenous voice
to be heard, cultural barriers or differences in rhetorical modes can obscure the
message.52 As one Indigenous leader at COP21 succinctly stated, “we are the
45 Fikret Birkes, Traditional Ecological Knowledge in Perspective, in TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL
KNOWLEDGE: CONCEPTS AND CASES, 1, 5 (Julian T. Inglis, ed., Int’l Dev. Res. Ctr. 1993); Comberti et al.,
supra note 10, at 5.
46 Birkes, supra note 45, at 5; Comberti et al., supra note 10, at 3.
47 Birkes, supra note 45, at 3.
48 Chief Robert Wavey, International Workshop on Indigenous Knowledge and Community-Based
Resource Management: Keynote Address, in TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE: CONCEPTS AND
CASES 11, 11-12 (Julian T. Inglis ed., Int’l Dev. Res. Ctr. 1993).
49 Chief Wavey, supra note 48, at 11-12; Comberti et al., supra note 10, at 18-19 (documenting
Indigenous peoples’ awareness of exceptional manners in which their environment is changing as evidence of climate change at subtle ecosystemic levels).
50 Khan, supra note 29, at 675-78.
51 Conference of the Parties, i.e., Parties to the climate regime.
52 Comberti et al., supra note 10, at 15 (personal anecdote from a COP, where after an Indigenous
leader’s speech, an audience member commented, “[i]t’s nice for them that they are here, but it wasn’t a
very well-structured presentation. I mean, they didn’t really convey any ideas very clearly, so I didn’t
really follow.” The author notes that this is a result of the audience member confronting an unrecogniz-
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ones already providing solutions to climate change and we are completely being
ignored.”53
D. Intentional Muting of Indigenous Voices
The climate regime is a reflection of South-of-South marginalization and resultant silencing.54 First, only States already members of the UN can adopt and
be Parties to the UNFCCC.55 Further, as discussed above, only States can be UN
members.56 Non-State Indigenous peoples, tribes, or nations are therefore not
Parties to any of the major environmental treaties and therefore have no say in
shaping IEL. One may counter that UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris
Agreement all contain the provision that any observer who is not a Party may
attend COP sessions. But the provision contains a massive caveat—they “. . .may
be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object” (emphasis
added).57 In practice, this means that any observer wanting to remain in attendance has to continuously appeal to at least two thirds of the parties present, which
can place one in the unfortunate position of having to choose between voicing an
opinion or remaining in the room.
Second, IEL leadership unfortunately physically marginalizes Indigenous peoples at the COPs. This intentional distancing can be seen in the spatial design of
the 2015 Paris COP21 that yielded the Paris Agreement. A November 2016 paper
by authors Comberti, Thornton, and Korodimou provides a first-hand account as
experienced by a translator for several Indigenous Amazonian leaders at the
COP.58 COP meetings are already confusing to the uninitiated, and require fluency in navigating the proceedings in order to even get ‘inside’ the conference.59
The translator noted that Hall 6, the space set aside for important discussions,
was placed far from civil society discussions in Hall 4. Also, the “green space”
set aside for Indigenous peoples (confusingly colored orange on notably uninformative maps) was located outside, not inside, the main conference, resulting
not in automatic inclusion of Indigenous attendees but rather automatic
exclusion.60
These are only a few examples of a calculated, or perhaps worse, mindless
silencing of voices with alternative points of view. Such silencing has enabled a
able mode of discourse). See also, Edward T. Hall, THE SILENT LANGUAGE (Doubleday & Co. 1959)
(whereby Western society will often speak of conclusions and personal beliefs, members of Indigenous
and other ethnic groups may speak in stories. They objectively convey no less accurate or clear information, but an individual less familiar with listening to a discursive communication style may be left with
the impression of a lower educational level or simply with confusion).
53 Comberti et al., supra note 10, at 15.
54 Id. at 13.
55 UNFCCC, supra note 1 Art. 7, ¶ 6.
56 U.N. Charter, Art. 4, ¶ 2.
57 UNFCCC, supra note 1, Art. 7, ¶ 6; Kyoto Protocol, supra note 11, at Art. 13, ¶ 8; Paris Agreement, supra note 6, at Art. 16, ¶ 8.
58 Comberti et al., supra note 10, at 13-14.
59 Comberti et al., supra note 10, at 14-15.
60 Comberti et al., supra note 10, at 13-15.
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broken carbon market structure and continues to distract us from making urgently
necessary improvements to global human systems and infrastructure.61
III.

Discussion

A. The ICC: Linking Climate Change and Human Rights
The Artic Environmental Protection Strategy (“AEPS”), which later became
the Artic Council (“AC”),62 is significant in this conversation. This international
organization gave Permanent Participant (PP) status to six Artic Indigenous Peoples Organizations (IPOs).63 The AC’s member IPOs include the Inuit Circumpolar Council (“ICC”) and five other Indigenous groups from the Artic region, most
of whose memberships are not defined by national borders, but rather by tribal
affiliation.64 According to the ICC’s Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Artic (“Inuit Declaration”), “Inuit are permanent participants in the
Artic Council with a direct and meaningful seat at discussion and negotiating
tables (emphasis added).”65 Explicit in this statement is the fact that they cannot
be removed from the AC, and implicit in it is that their voices are heard. This is
currently a unique position for an Indigenous nation.
Thus empowered, in 2005 the president of the ICC petitioned the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IAHCR”) with a claim against the United
States (“U.S.”).66 The claim pointed to the U.S. government’s knowledge about
links between rising global temperatures and greenhouse gasses (“GHGs”), the
U.S. being the largest emitter of GHGs, its failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol,
and its negligible efforts to reduce emissions.67 Most importantly, the Inuit Petition presented the idea that the U.S. government knew the impacts these decisions were having on the Artic, and by extension, on the Inuit people.68 Though
the IACHR did not proceed with the Petition, it nonetheless was the first instance
of international legal action establishing a link between climate change and
human rights.69 The Petition was featured in the front section of the New York
Times70 and given press coverage by the BBC.71 It subsequently contributed to
61

Dehm, supra note 3, at 134.
History of the Arctic Council Permanent Participants, THE ARCTIC COUNCIL (Aug. 28, 2015)
https://arctic-council.org/en/news/history-of-the-arctic-council-permanent-participants/.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic, adopted by the Inuit Circumpolar
Council, INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL – ALASKA (Apr. 2009), https://iccalaska.org/wp-icc/wp-content/
uploads/2016/01/Signed-Inuit-Sovereignty-Declaration-11x17.pdf [hereinafter Inuit Declaration].
66 Inuit Petition and the IAHCR, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, https://
www.ciel.org/project-update/inuit-petition-and-the-iachr/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2021) [hereinafter CIEL].
67 Jacqueline Peel & Hari M. Osofsky, A Rights Turn in Climate Litigation?, 7 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL.
L. 37, 47 (2018).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Andrew C. Revkin, Eskimos Seek to Recast Global Warming as a Rights Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
15, 2004, at A3.
62
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an IAHCR decision to investigate this crucial link on its own a year later, bringing the plight of the Inuit into the eye of the public and creating a new legal
avenue for climate change redress.72 This was the first time an international
human rights tribunal was asked to consider the human rights implications of
climate change.73
The claim holds two important considerations and is not insignificant, even in
its lack of apparent success. First, it exposed to the public for the first time the
concept that climate change violates human rights. This accomplished several
things. It shed light on and publicized a critical but under-examined aspect of
climate change. It also humanized an otherwise-marginalized and possibly unknown South-of-South nation. People who may have been unaware of the Inuit
would have read or heard about them as a people fighting for rights that the
readers might also want for themselves. Or, there are those who may have read
about the claims of injustice and identified with the Inuit. Further, such press
may shed light on the plight of other Indigenous people whose human rights are
similarly affected by the effects of climate change or bring public awareness to
the plight of all those who live off the land, including other Indigenous peoples.
The second important consideration the claim implicates is that, as the first
legal claim of its kind,74 it created the possibility of human rights claims against
States, and possibly non-States, who have contributed to GHGs and thus caused
harm to myriad individuals as well as groups or other Indigenous nations. The
fact that the ICC president filed the Inuit Petition on behalf of a group that is
representative of her tribe is significant for three reasons. First, it has motivated
other peoples to follow suit.75 The Arctic Athabaskan Peoples filed a complaint
against the Canadian government in 2013, arguing that Canada violated their
human rights due to high levels of Canadian black carbon emissions, and asked
for a remedy based on the implications of the impact such emissions have on
their human rights.76 Second, the Inuit Petition was filed on behalf of a community of people whose bonds cross international borders.77 As international law is
so State-centric, the ICC approach is an important reminder that alternative governance schema are not just possible but functional. Last, it is not a suit by an
individual against a State requesting redress for harms to that individual, but
rather a suit brought by representatives of a nation claiming redress for the impact a State’s actions had on that community’s way of life. This is empowering
for nations who might want to make claims against States in the future.

71 Richard Black, Inuit Sue U.S. Over Climate Policy, BBC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2005, 6:53 PM GMT),
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However, the case was not made possible in isolation. It was only with both
the support of the AC and under several principles of international law delineated
in two international treaties that the Inuit were able to file their Petition.
B. The Significance of Permanent Position Status
The Arctic Council (“AC”) was instrumental in assisting the Inuit to bring the
Petition. The AC is an international organization comprised of eight membernations, including the U.S. and Canada.78 Its mission is to promote “cooperation,
coordination, and interaction among the Artic States, Arctic Indigenous communities, and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues.”79 Participation in
the AC gave the Inuit a legitimate voice in international decision-making on matters that affect them. As mentioned above, it is rare that a non-State group or
tribe has any status whatsoever in international environmental law.80 When the
UNGA was crafting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (“UNDRIP”), Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the U.S. loudly
voiced their opinion against providing Indigenous groups too much power. They
claimed that giving Indigenous peoples a voice in international governance might
provide them veto power over domestic policy and legislation.81 If the ICC did
not have PP status, the ICC president’s bold move might have been used to silence the Inuit voice on the AC or, worse, see them expelled from the organization by the U.S. or Canada. Alternatively, the knowledge of this possibility could
have precluded the ICC president from filing in the first place.
C. International Indigenous Legal Rights
The Inuit were able to file their Petition based upon several principles guiding
international law that grant the Inuit – and indeed, all Indigenous peoples – the
right to an active voice in international environmental governance.82
First, the UNDRIP affirms that Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination, noting “the fundamental importance of the right to self-determination
of all peoples, by virtue of which they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”83 Second, the
right to self-determination goes hand in hand with the right to sovereignty, by
which one is deemed to have “authority over territory, resources, and ‘peoples.’”84 The International Labor Organization Convention 169 (“ILO 169”) re78

THE ARCTIC COUNCIL, https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us (last visited Dec. 26,

2021).
79

About, THE ARCTIC COUNCIL, https://arctic-council.org/en/about/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2021).
Peel & Osofsky, supra note 67, at 46.
81 Sarah Nykolaishen, Customary International Law and the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, 17 APPEAL 111, 122 (2012).
82 Khan, supra note 29, at 676.
83 G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295, annex, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP].
84 Khan, supra note 29, at 676.
80

Volume 18, Issue 1

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

123

The Indigenous Alternative

inforces Indigenous rights to land and resources, as it is the only internationally
binding treaty related to Indigenous peoples.85
The Inuit Declaration interprets self-determination more broadly than did UNDRIP.86 The Inuit Declaration states, “It is our right to freely determine our political status, freely pursue our economic, social, cultural and linguistic
development, and freely dispose of our natural wealth and resources. States are
obligated to respect and promote the realization of our right to self-determination.”87 Plus, for the Inuit, self-determination is impossible without sovereignty,
because their ability to continue as a society depends on the health and vitality of
the tundra, sea, land, and ice that comprise their traditional hunting, gathering,
and fishing grounds.88
UNDRIP and ILO 169 are clearly important; however, treaties are binding
solely on countries that have ratified them.89 Over 150,000 Inuit90 live in a territory stretching across international borders.91 As a result, the decisions of any
one of Denmark, Greenland, Canada, the U.S., or Russia can impact Inuit
Nunaat, the Inuit homeland.92 Of those countries, only Denmark has ratified ILO
169.93 So, though ILO 169 and UNDRIP delineate important principles for Indigenous nations in international law, they do not afford the Inuit or other Indigenous peoples any protection on the international stage. For example, the Inuit
have taken issue with the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”) for failing to include their nation’s concerns and voices in UNCLOS processes and thus impinging on their right to sovereignty under UNDRIP, but UNCLOS’s own framework provides only for State sovereignty.94 So,
although UNDRIP and ILO 169 are available as evidence of the Indigenous right
to sovereignty and self-determination, in practice they provide no real rights or
power.95
The Inuit Petition is therefore particularly important. Against the backdrop of
UNDRIP and ILO 169, its filing furthered the process by which to create customary international law to recognize Indigenous rights. In the absence of State ratification, customary international law is the primary way principles of selfdetermination and sovereignty under UNDRIP and ILO 169 will gain weight in
international governance. The situation the Inuit experienced in contending with
85
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UNCLOS is clear proof international law “still does not recognize Indigenous
peoples as full and equal participants in international law-making.”96 However,
UNDRIP continues to acknowledge Indigenous peoples as international legal actors.97 Therefore, active Indigenous participation in climate regime governance
may yield not only workable solutions to climate change but also promote Indigenous rights.
IV.

Proposal: Reimagining the Climate Regime’s CDM

Reimagining the CDM is particularly crucial at this moment in time, considering both that the Paris Agreement’s global temperature increase limitation goals98
are likely to go unmet, and that the looming impacts of such a prognosis are so
severe.99 Increasing Indigenous participation in the climate regime may serve not
only to support Indigenous rights but also to address seemingly inherent
problems with carbon markets and the CDM.100 Civil society movements are
highly critical of the carbon market system as a primary cause of this failure,
concerned about resulting environmental and social justice fallout.101 It is possible, however, that the carbon market system is not inherently broken.
We must first address a common misconception. It would be easy to assume
that the “Indigenous voice” is unified or consistent, or that “Indigenous peoples”
are all the same simply by virtue of certain parallel facts, but this is not the case.
Certainly, the term often refers to a country’s original population.102 However,
other definitions include (1) self-identification as Indigenous; (2) being the nonEuropean group living in an area colonized by Europeans; (3) remaining socially
isolated from mainstream society; (4) identification to certain territories and natural resources; and/or, (5) maintaining traditions despite surroundings or land being transformed by outside societies.103 There is no one definition of
“Indigenous,”104 and it is in this diversity of world views, outlooks, and history
that the power of Indigenous participation may reside. As is demonstrated by the
Inuit Petition, Indigenous participation in international law-making uncovers creative and perhaps new solutions to seemingly unsolvable problems.
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A. First Steps
Indigenous voices must first be given voice in climate regime fora before any
solutions may be brought. This is in perfect keeping with the Paris Agreement
Article 7, par. 5, which states, “. . .adaptation action should be based on and
guided by. . .as appropriate, traditional knowledge, knowledge of Indigenous
peoples and local knowledge systems.”105 When those educated in TEK are not
present at key moments in decision-making, this mandate is severely impaired if
not entirely eschewed. The question becomes, how could giving non-State actors
unprecedented status at climate regime COPs be achieved and justified, e.g., “appropriate?” There are two possible answers.
First, Indigenous peoples might be included in a key Paris Agreement compliance mechanism, the expert committee of Article 15, par. 2.106 This would undoubtedly bring fresh, unique, and practical ideas, and perhaps address the
concern that the climate regime is a technocratic, top-down system because Indigenous experts are, in many cases, both scientific experts and local actors.107
Though Western society tends to define ‘experts’ only as those who have gone
through the rigors of a university or other Western-accredited methods, Indigenous experts have different but comparable levels of knowledge. Consider that a
scientist’s background and working situation(s) play a critical role in determining
“their scientific socialization and the research they engage with.”108 Though
members of Indigenous societies, nations, and tribes may not always attain their
scientific knowledge through a university education, Indigenous experts nonetheless possess extensive and valuable scientific traditional knowledge, different
from but complementary to knowledge held by Western scientists. Their TEK
provides not only data but unique temporal and historical place-based information, as well as distinctive methods of environmental best practices.109 One notable example comes from anthropologists’ work with Philippine horticulturalists,
one of whom possessed incredibly detailed knowledge about over 1,600 plant
species.110 Another example comes again from the Inuit, whose numerous words
for different types of snow were adopted by Western science when English vocabulary on the topic was not sufficiently accurate.111 A last critical example
comes from the Zuni people. Where modern industrial agriculture removes
groundwater faster than it is replaced, applies over 500,000 tons of pesticides per
year, and loses seven tons of topsoil to erosion each year, Zuni “dry farming”
practices have allowed them to survive and thrive in the dry, arid lands of the
American southwest for 1,500 years without detrimental effect to the environ105
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108 Frank Biermann & Ina Möller, Rich Man’s Solution? Climate Engineering Discourses and the
Marginalization of the Global South, INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL. L. & ECON. 1, 7 (Mar. 6, 2019).
109 LaDuke, supra note 29, at 127.
110 Berkes, supra note 45, at 1.
111 Id. at 2.
106

126

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

Volume 18, Issue 1

The Indigenous Alternative

ment or to their ability to produce food.112 Indigenous individuals with such irreplaceable, valuable knowledge are indeed experts, though it may have been
gathered through non-Western means. Including those with such relevant, critical, and timely knowledge in expert panels is clearly a winning situation for
Indigenous rights and for the climate regime – to do otherwise is a loss for both.
Another option would be to grant either permanent participant (“PP”) status,
which the Inuit enjoy in the Artic Council, or voting status, to Indigenous nations
in climate governance structures. In politics, decisions are made largely by those
present in the room at the time.113 Either position would enable Indigenous
voices to remain in the room regardless of the power, status, or opinions of other
actors. PP or voting status would ensure that TEK and the abovementioned expert knowledge would be present during important discussions. To ensure both
that customary international law evolves to recognize Indigenous nations’
rights,114 and that effective means develop to truly address climate change, overt
inclusion of Indigenous peoples in the climate regime is a logical conclusion.
Once there is a platform for the diversity of Indigenous voices to be expressed
on the international stage without fear of retribution, any number of solutions
may present themselves. As will be explored below, incorporating and considering TEK and Indigenous ideas may in fact address and remedy seemingly unsolvable problems with the CDM.
B. Carbon Offsetting Reimagined
What if the CDM is not inherently broken?115 True, carbon markets in their
current iteration have done damage116 while failing to address root causes of
climate change.117 It is possible, however, that global aggregation and market
mechanisms are salvageable component aspects of the system.118 To properly
utilize the CDM per Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, States shall (par. 2) “promote sustainable development” and “ensure environmental integrity.”119 Orienting the CDM to ensure these goals are met could ensure the CDM be
redeployed properly. To come into compliance with Article 6, any reimagined
method would have to reduce real aggregate emissions instead of allowing the
global North to purchase offset credits and simply continue emitting.120 Thus,
any reimagined CDM must disincentivize and ultimately decrease overall carbon
consumption. Below are two possible applicable Indigenous philosophies.
112
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i. Chipko Economics
The Chipko, a people of the Himalayan mountains in India whose name means
“Hug-to-the-tree people” in their language, began a movement to save their forests in the 1970s,121 with the slogan of “What do the forests bear? Soil, water,
and pure air.”122 In 1977, the Chipko halted commercial harvesting of trees in
their region.123 With three members of the tribe literally hugging the base of each
tree, contractors and truckloads of police found themselves unable to cut down
the trees and withdrew.124 The Chipko were subsequently able to convince the
government to ban Himalayan logging.125
The Chipko understand economics in an entirely different – but no less valid –
manner from the West. Sundral Bahuguna, one of the leaders of the Chipko
Movement, notes how modern “economic growth is based on the plunder of nature – the great treasure of hundreds of thousands of years. . . . The irony is that
this type of economics is actually uneconomical, because. . .you undermine your
basic capital.”126 This “basic capital” consists of soil, water, and air, the foundation for the healthy existence of all life. Bahuguna explains that Western economics has created an inaccurate distinction between development, defined as the
materialistic accumulation of things, and ecology, defined as an aesthetically
pleasing natural setting.127 However, Bahuguna states that the real distinction
should be made between Western “economic growth,” generally destructive of
the environment, and true sustainable ecological development.128 Thus while
Western economics positions human improvement as defined by financial accumulation of personal material wealth often in opposition to ecological health,
Chipko economic theory instead explains that long-term growth is only possible
with an absence of environmental destruction. Healthy ecological systems are a
‘permanent economy’ based on three self-renewing pillars of ecological capital –
clean water, air, and land.129
Sustainable ecological development would therefore be a basic tenet of a
CDM operating under Chipko economics. Instead of defining development as
enabling Western economic success as measured by level of income per household or quantities of cars driven, success instead would be measured by resultant
quality of local, national, and/or international basic capital. Thus, for example,
121 Chipko Information Centre, The Chipko Message, Uttar Pradesh, India 8, http://www.uky.edu/
~tmute2/nature-society/password-protect/nature-society-pdfs/chipkoMovementStatement.pdf [hereinafter
Chipko Message].
122 Id. at 7.
123 Id. at 9.
124 Chipko Message, supra note 121, at 9-10.
125 Id. at 6, 8 (describing how the Chipko name was derived from a similar successful protest against a
Maharajah almost 250 years prior, though the historical protest yielded substantially higher loss of
arboreal and human life).
126 Chipko Message, supra note 121, at 11.
127 Chipko Message, supra note 121, at 10.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 10-11.

128

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

Volume 18, Issue 1

The Indigenous Alternative

any company or State engaged in JI projects in a developing country would have
to ensure that any and all results of the project would also entail true ecological
development and leave the water, air, and soil significantly and measurably
cleaner at local, national, and international levels than before the project had
commenced and for the lifecycle of the project.
Under a Chipko model, money exchanged in carbon markets would disincentivize fossil fuel production and consumption because both damage all three ecological pillars. Currently, carbon markets are a simple exchange of capital where
a country or company polluting over their NDC purchases credits on an open
market from a country or entity that is polluting less, and in return is relieved of
NDC contribution violations.130 This type of detached market transaction offends
Chipko ideals and also violates the Paris Agreement as discussed above because
it neither promotes sustainable development nor ensures environmental integrity131 – the purchaser is free to continue degrading soil, water, and air at will.
A carbon market approach under Chipko theory may remedy this issue if it
were to grant polluters the right to purchase offset credits only within a broader
ecological context. First, as a policy matter Indigenous peoples employing TEK
would be considered experts on the topic of ecological development – after all,
they are often the single example of truly sustainable existence in a given region
or country.132 A system operating under Chipko theory may therefore employ
them to advise, teach, or help polluters reduce their carbon footprint. Further,
Indigenous sellers in possession of valuable TEK that encourages rehabilitation
or support of the ecological pillars might be granted higher-value credits to sell.
Such high-value credits could require that purchasers commit to more significant
reductions in energy consumption, or to a timeline by which to eliminate their
fossil fuel dependence entirely. Alternatively, all carbon offset credit buyers
might be required as a condition of purchase to present a plan to reduce real
emissions, receive fines if they prove unable or unwilling to achieve their plan’s
results over a reasonable period of time, and require advising by appropriate
abovementioned Indigenous experts. Chipko economic theory is therefore one
way to reimagine the CDM while meeting Paris Agreement goals.
ii. Buen Vivir
Buen vivir is a movement and philosophy that has somewhat recently become
well-known from and among a variety of South American Indigenous peoples.133
The concepts embodied in buen vivir analogously present themselves in various
South American tribes – as sumac kawasy in the Quichua language, suma
qamaña in Aymara, shiir waras by the Shuars, küme mongen by the Mapuche,
and in various ideas present in the Guaranı́ culture.134 Literally translated from
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the Spanish as “the good life,” buen vivir is best thought of a way of living well,
which requires living a full life in community with both other people and nature.135 Its popularity came largely from South American outrage to the negative
environmental and human rights impacts of large-scale, top-down development
projects funded by multilateral, multinational financial institutions.136 As it made
its way through Latin American culture, concepts taken from buen vivir have
been incorporated in both the Ecuadorian and Bolivian constitutions in 2008 and
2009, respectively.137
Though there are many ways in which buen vivir is employed and deployed,
for our purposes we will consider how it envisions development – or rather, how
it does not. Unlike the Chipko Movement which accepts but redefines development, buen vivir is predicated on the idea that it is important not to seek ‘alternative development,’ but rather to seek ‘alternatives to development.’138 That is,
that the goal of society orienting around development and economic growth is
inherently flawed. In fact, the language and traditions of several Indigenous cultures in South America entirely lack the concept of Western progress or economic development.139
Reimagining the CDM in light of buen vivir ideology, then, development
would clearly not be a goal. That is not to say, however, that buen vivir can’t
apply to and transform carbon markets and in doing so achieve real reductions in
GHG emissions.
In keeping with the community orientation so central to buen vivir, carbon
credit buyers become part of the community whose carbon offset credits it offers
to purchase. Though it would be most logical under this theory to buy and sell
credits in the immediate physical vicinity to any polluting entity – for example,
within a 200-mile radius – buyers might solicit credits from any seller in its
“community,” as appropriately defined. In any case, exchanges under buen vivir
would be significantly more than a single monetary transfer of funds. To ensure
the health of the whole community, which includes not only people but nature as
well, a buyer perhaps must demonstrate measurable reduction its GHG emissions
as well as reduction in fossil fuel reliance, dependence, and/or production as applicable. There would be an objective standard of required reduction per dollar
spent or per credit purchased. If the purchaser is or becomes unable or unwilling
to meet these requirements, the community offering carbon credits for sale refuses the transaction or the contract is considered breached with remedies available to the seller. It would not be in keeping with buen vivir that money would be
exchanged to do good on one level while harm on another level would continue
with impunity. Alternatively, the buyer might be allowed to defer compliance if it
demonstrates inability or incapacity to comply at the time of purchase, and instead opt to educate its members in the plight that its violations cause other mem135
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bers of the community. There would of course be a compliance timeline with
penalties imposed as well as additional fees for this option.
JI projects would have to comply with goals set forth by buen vivir philosophy. Carbon market-based funding for projects would not be channeled through
the State but rather go directly to the local economy. For example, a project to
build a bridge under buen vivir ideology would be made with local and biodegradable materials to local specifications in a place and in a manner not dictated by a foreign bank or by the government. The bridge is a success if it did
minimal damage to nature and natural resources, and if it successfully served
local and regional, not international, needs.140
Buen vivir has been applied in many ways with various interpretations across
the countries whose Indigenous and non-Indigenous populations use it.141 There
are doubtless other methods of deploying its concepts, with the above examples
as just one possibility.
V.

Conclusion

Though this comment has applied Chipko142 and buen vivir143 philosophies to
climate change, many sustainable economic systems may exist within other Indigenous communities,144 as of yet unheard. Were an Indigenous expert to hold a
position of real authority on a UN committee, and/or a tribe to obtain voting
status in the IEL regime, true progress towards addressing climate change might
finally be made. Indigenous individuals, nations, and tribes would be properly
equipped, situated, and empowered to suggest and help deploy actually sustainable TEK and, for example, reimagine the CDM such that climate change mitigation or sustainable adaptation would be possible. Such methods would not just
put money into the pockets of an elite few145 but employ Indigenous peoples and
educate others in sustainable TEK methodologies that create clean water, clean
air, and healthy soil, and ensure ecological sustainability for future generations.
It is entirely possible that the aforementioned unmet goals of the Paris Agreement146 can still be achieved. Important to recall is the history of international
law, still operating upon antiquated international legal concepts of the civilizing
mission of colonialization.147 State-centric decision-making methodologies have
implemented a system that negatively impacts the human rights of those already
140
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affected while failing to address the root causes of climate change,148 as the
planet grows ever warmer.149 Carbon markets are currently being implemented
using flawed ideas and corrupt methodologies, but this comment asserts that the
CDM is not necessarily inherently broken. If Indigenous experts are appropriately recognized for their vast wealth of knowledge150 and empowered with a
permanent voice in the international climate regime, it may well be possible to
successfully reimagine carbon markets and actually achieve the goals of the Paris
Agreement.
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